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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) revolution promises to
make our lives easier by providing cheap and always connected
smart embedded devices, which can interact on the Internet and
create added values for human needs. But all that glitters is
not gold. Indeed, the other side of the coin is that, from a
security perspective, this IoT revolution represents a potential
disaster. This plethora of IoT devices that flooded the market
were very badly protected, thus an easy prey for several families
of malwares that can enslave and incorporate them in very large
botnets. This, eventually, brought back to the top Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, making them more powerful
and easier to achieve than ever. This paper aims at provide
an up-to-date picture of DDoS attacks in the specific subject
of the IoT, studying how these attacks work and considering
the most common families in the IoT context, in terms of their
nature and evolution through the years. It also explores the
additional offensive capabilities that this arsenal of IoT malwares
has available, to mine the security of Internet users and systems.
We think that this up-to-date picture will be a valuable reference
to the scientific community in order to take a first crucial step
to tackle this urgent security issue.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly and unavoidablychanging our society, affecting the way we live and work.
The IoT mission is to enable everyday objects to communicate
with each other through the Internet, resulting in a figurative
tsunami of connectivity. From a business perspective, IoT is
all about excitement. Firms are rushing the development of
their IoT products in order to commercialise them as soon as
possible, and stay on the crest of the wave. IoT predictions
by several consultancy firms (like Bain, McKinsey, General
Eletric, to mention only a few) clearly show that the IoT
market will become massive in the coming 10 years. For
instance, IHS forecasts that the IoT market will grow from
a base of 15.4 billion devices in 2015 to 30.7 billion devices
in 2020 and 75.4 billion in 20251.
From a security perspective, all this excitement goes to
the detriment of the IoT devices security, causing a potential
disaster. Indeed, security still represents the most overlooked
characteristic when quickness is considered of paramount
importance for business. Moreover, the massive distribution
of such connected devices to the “average security-unsavvy
user”, evokes IoT acronyms like the not-so-funny “Internet
of Troubles”2. More connected and non-secure (or unsecured)
1https://www.ihs.com/Info/0416/internet-of-things.html [May 10th, 2017].
2https://security-online.net/iot-like-internet-troubles [May 10th, 2017].
devices entails more attack vectors and more possibilities for
hackers to target us, access our sensible data and control our
devices. Talking about security and IoT devices, the 2016 is
still remembered as the year of Mirai, namely a powerful
malware that managed to infect hundreds of thousands of
connected devices all over the world through a dictionary
attack (composed of just 50 entries), relying upon the fact
that these devices use default login credentials and that most
of the users never change those credentials. On October 21th
2016, this massive botnet (network of infected devices) was
used to struck what is currently considered the largest Dis-
tributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack ever seen, reaching
a magnitude of about 1.2 Terabits per second.
Contribution of the Paper. The security disaster in this IoT
tsunami of connectivity has made DDoS attacks more and
more popular among the cyber-criminal community. DDoS
attacks have rapidly evolved in the last few years, becoming
more complex and especially more powerful and effective, as
Mirai showed. Besides, to the best of our knowledge, the last
research work discussing a taxonomy of DDoS attacks has
been conducted in the early 2008 [1], long before the IoT
outburst. Therefore, this paper aims at studying DDoS attacks
with focus on the IoT context. In particular, the contribution
of our analysis is twofold:
1) We start from an up-to-date comprehensive taxonomy of
DDoS attacks based on previous scientific literature and
the latest performed attacks, and we place the emphasis
on IoT devices. The taxonomy is obtained by combining
several surveys in the literature [1]–[13] and by refining
the taxonomy previously proposed in [14].
2) Using the new DDoS taxonomy as foundation of our
study, we provide a detailed analysis of all the DDoS
capable IoT malwares since 2008. The analysis clearly
shows the evolution of these malwares through the
years, as well as the increasing number of new malware
families per year.
The overall aim of the paper is to provide a first comprehensive
reference to the security community, in order to understand the
latest DDoS attacks targeting the IoT domain.
Outline of the Paper. Section II introduces DDoS attacks,
focusing on the key characteristics that make them possible
and so powerful. Sections III and IV present the proposed
taxonomy of DDoS attacks and the analysis of DDoS-capable
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IoT malwares, respectively. Section V analyses the collected
data and draws some remarkable observations. Finally, Section
VI sums up the contribution of the paper.
II. HOW DDOS ATTACKS ARE POSSIBLE?
What makes DDoS attacks possible and extremely powerful
is the intrinsic nature of Internet itself, designed with the aim
of functionality, rather than security. While being utterly ef-
fective, the Internet is inherently vulnerable to several security
issues that can be used to perpetrate a DDoS attack [3], [5]:
• Internet security is extremely interdependent – It does not
matter how well secured the victim system may be, its
vulnerability to DDoS attacks depends on the security of
the rest of the global Internet;
• Internet entities have limited resources – Each Internet
entity (such as hosts, networks, services, etc.) has limited
resources that can be saturated by a given number of
users;
• Many is better than a few – Coordinated and concur-
rent distributed attacks will always be effective, if the
resources of the attacker are greater than the resources of
the victim;
• Intelligence and resources are not collocated – Most of
the intelligence, needed to guarantee services, is located
in end hosts. Nevertheless, the requirement of large
throughput brought to design high bandwidth pathways
in the intermediate network. As a result, attackers can ex-
ploit the abundant resources of the intermediate network
in order to deliver a great number of malicious messages
to the victim;
• Accountability is not enforced – In IP packets, the source
address field is assumed to carry the IP address of the host
that creates the packet. However, this is an assumption
which is not validated or enforced at all, therefore there
is the opportunity to perpetrate an IP source address
spoofing3 attack. This attack provides attackers a power-
ful mechanisms to avoid responsibility for their actions;
• Control is distributed – Internet management is dis-
tributed and each network can work with local policies
defined by its administrators. Consequently, there is no
way to deploy a global security mechanism or policy and
it is often impossible to investigate cross-network traffic
behaviour due to privacy issues.
Notably, a DDoS attack needs to go through the following
phases in order to be struck [3], [5]:
1) Recruitment. The attacker scans for vulnerable machines
(called agents), aiming to use them later in the DDoS
attack against the real victim. In the past this process
was performed manually but nowadays several scanning
tools can be used to do this automatically;
2) Exploitation & Infection. The agent machines are ex-
ploited using the discovered vulnerabilities and the
3IP source address spoofing is a cyber-attack which consists in creating an
IP packet with a false source IP address, hiding the identity of the real sender
or even impersonating another Internet entity.
malicious code is injected. This phase has also been
automated and nowadays several self-propagating tools
can be used for further recruiting new agents;
3) Communication. The attacker uses the handlers or the
IRC channel (depending on the botnet architecture, refer
to subsection III-A for further details) to identify which
agents are up and running, when to schedule the attacks
or when to upgrade the agents;
4) Attack. The attacker commands the onset of the at-
tack and the agent machines start to send malicious
packets. Attack parameters (such as victim, duration,
malicious packets properties, etc.) are tuned in this
phase. Although IP spoofing is not always required for
a successful DDoS attack, attackers usually opt for an
additional anonymity layer, hiding the identity of agent
machines during the attack.
III. DDOS ATTACKS CLASSIFICATION
DDoS attacks can be classified in many ways (Fig. 1). In this
section, we succinctly report a complete taxonomy, obtained
by combining several surveys in the literature [1]–[13].
A. Architecture Model
The architecture of a DDoS attack considers how the
involved actors interact. There are basically four types of
network architectures that can be used to perpetrate a DDoS
attack [1], [9]: Agent-Handler Model, Reflector Model, IRC-
Based Model, Web-Based Model.
1) Agent-Handler Model: This model (Fig. 2a) is composed
by clients, handlers (or masters) and agents (or daemons or
secondary victims) [2]. Clients are used by the attacker to
communicate with the handlers, which are software packages
located somewhere in the Internet, that infect network re-
sources and rely information from the clients to the agents.
The agent is a block of code that runs on a compromised
system and performs the attack against the final victim. The
term agent is used to refer both to the compromised machine
and to the running code. According to the configuration of the
network architecture, the set of agents (referred as a botnet)
can equally interact with a single handler or multiple handlers.
2) Reflector Model: This model (Fig. 2b) is similar to the
Agent-Handler one, but exhibits an additional set of uninfected
machines, called reflectors. The reflectors are induced by the
handlers to send a stream of packets against the victim. Often,
the handlers spoof the victim IP address, in order to solicit the
reflectors to send the replies to the victim. This leads to the
production of a large amount of network traffic addressed to
the target host [1]. The reflectors are often used as amplifiers
by sending the stream of packets to the broadcast address4 of
the reflector network and triggering reply packets from each
host within their LAN. A Reflector can be any host in the
Internet able to respond to IP requests (e.g., a web server that
responds to TCP SYN requests) because the attacker does not
4Broadcast IP address feature: when a sending system specifies a broadcast
IP address as the destination address, the routers replicate the packet and send
it to all the IP addresses within the broadcast address range [2].
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Fig. 1. DDoS Attacks Taxonomy
need to infect it. DDoS attacks that use this model are also
known as Distributed Reflection Denial of Service (DRDoS)
attacks and they are harder to trace back than the ones based
on the Agent-Handler Model [4], [5], [15], [16].
3) Internet Relay Chat-Based Model: This model (Fig. 2c)
is similar to the Agent-Handler one, with the only difference
that the client connects to the agents relying on an IRC-
based communication channel, instead of the handlers. Internet
Relay Chat (IRC) is a client/server textual protocol, used to
implement a multi-user and multi-channel chat system.
4) Web-Based Model: This model is similar to the IRC-
Based one, but here the communication is HTTP/HTTPS
based. Moreover, the majority of the agents are fully con-
figured and controlled through complex PHP scripts and
encrypted communications, while a number of agents is used
only to report statistics to a controlling Web site [9].
B. Exploited Vulnerability
DDoS attacks can exploit different vulnerabilities to jeop-
ardize their victims. Based on the strategy that is used to
deny services, it is possible to classify them in two different
categories [1]–[4], [7], [10], [13]: Bandwidth Depletion (or
Brute-Force) and Resource Depletion.
1) Bandwidth Depletion (or Brute-Force): In this type of
attacks, a great amount of apparently legitimate packets are
sent to the victim, in order to clog up its communication
resources (e.g., network bandwidth) and also its computational
ones (e.g., CPU time, memory, etc.) preventing them to be
reached by legitimate traffic. These attacks can be further
divided into Flood and Amplification attacks [1], [2], [5],
[6], [10], [13]. In Flood attacks, the botnet directly sends a
large volume of IP traffic to the victim machine to congest
its network resources and prevent access by legitimate users,
while in Amplification attacks the agents use intermediaries
reflectors (Section III-A), exploiting the broadcast IP address
feature with the spoofed address of the victim.
Flood attacks are the most used ones because they are
easy to achieve, yet very effective; well-known examples are
SYN Flood and UDP Flood attacks. On the other hand, DNS
Amplification is a highly popular type of Amplification attack:
based on the principle that tiny DNS requests generate much
bigger reply packets, a whole botnet can impersonate the
target, spoofing its IP address, and send a high number of
requests in its stead. As expected, the target will be hit by a
massive quantity of replies and experience a DoS event.
Another emerging DDoS attack, exhibited recently by Mirai,
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is the so-called Valve Source Engine (VSE) Flood, which is
a particular type of UDP Amplification attack that targets
gaming servers by sending them specific requests (TSource
Engine Query) from many different devices.
2) Resource Depletion: These attacks aim to preventing
the victim to process legitimate requests, by exhausting its
resources, and can be further characterized in Protocol Exploit
and Malformed Packet attacks [1], [2], [5], [6], [10], [13]. In
Protocol Exploit attacks, an implementation bug of a protocol
or a specific feature installed on the victim are exploited in
order to consume its resources, whereas in Malformed Packet
attacks incorrectly formed IP packets are sent from the agents
to the target (e.g., putting the same IP address into both source
and destination fields).
An interesting example of Malformed Packet attack is
the so-called TCP XMAS. This type of attack consists into
manipulating some packets by turning on all the flags (es-
pecially URG, PUSH and FIN flags). It is very unusual and
totally unexpected that this combination of flags appears into
a standard packet, and a lot of time and effort is required,
in order to process it, which can eventually crash the target
system.
C. Protocol Level
DDoS attacks can be distinguished according to the TCP/IP
layer of the protocol used during the attack [9], [17]: Network
Level and Application Level. In Network Level DDoS attacks,
either Network or Transport layer protocols are used to carry
out the attack, while in Application Level DDoS attacks the
victim resources (e.g., CPU, memory, disk/database, etc.) are
exhausted targeting Application layer protocols. Clear exam-
ples of Network Level attacks are SYN Flood, UDP Flood and
TCP Flood attacks, whereas HTTP Flood, DNS Query Flood
and DNS Amplification attacks belong to Application Level
group of attacks.
An interesting example of an Application Level attack is
the DNS Water Torture, which is a DDoS attack that targets
specifically Authoritative DNS servers, which are indirectly
disrupted by sending a huge quantity of random queries to
Open Resolvers, queries that are forwarded to Cache DNS
servers and, finally, to the Authoritative DNS servers. Even
though the intended target is the latter, as a side-effect also
Cache DNS servers face huge slow-downs in their operations.
D. Degree of Automation
Based on the Degree of Automation, DDoS attacks can be
classified into three different categories [1], [3], [5]: Manual,
Semi-automatic and Automatic.
1) Manual: In Manual DDoS attacks, the attacker individ-
ually scans remote devices looking for any vulnerability. Once
a vulnerability is found, the attacker manually breaks into the
machine, installs attack code and then commands the onset of
the attack. Only the early DDoS attacks belong to this category
because today all the attack phases are automated.
2) Semi-automatic: In Semi-automatic DDoS attacks the
recruitment and exploitation & infection of the agents are
automated. The only phases which are still manually per-
formed by the attacker are the communication phase (when
the attacker instructs the botnet with type, start time, duration
and victim of the attack) and the attack phase [18]. Based on
the Communication Mechanism used between attackers and
handlers (see Section III-A), Semi-automatic DDoS attacks
can be done by Direct Communication (if based on the Agent-
Handler Model) or by Indirect Communication (if based on the
IRC-Based Model.
3) Automatic: In these attacks, all the phases are automated
(recruitment, exploitation & infection, attack), thus there is
no need for communication between attacker and botnet.
The start time, type, duration and victim of the attack are
preprogrammed in the attack code. This category is the one
which offers the minimal exposure for the attacker, since he
is only involved in issuing the command that starts the attack.
In both Automatic and Semi-automatic attacks, the recruit-
ment of agent machines is achieved through automatic scan-
ning strategies (Subsection III-E) and propagation techniques
(Subsection III-F). Notably, some DDoS attacks can use a
mixed approach: for instance, the recruitment and the attack
could be automated while the exploitation & infection and the
communication could be performed manually.
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E. Scanning Strategy
During the recruitment phase, the attacker finds as many
vulnerable machines as possible with a network scanning.
Based on the scanning strategy, it is possible to classify DDoS
attacks into five classes [1], [3]: Random Scanning, Hitlist
Scanning, Signpost (or Topological) Scanning, Permutation
Scanning, Local Subnet Scanning.
1) Random Scanning: With this scanning strategy, each
compromised host uses a different seed to probe random
addresses in the IP address space. As an example, Mirai
utilizes a pure Random Scanning approach, randomly looking
for any kind of IoT equipped with default login credentials.
2) Hitlist Scanning: With this scanning strategy, the scan-
ning machine has an external list of possible victims to
probe. Once the attacker detects and infects a new vulnerable
machine, it forwards a portion of the initial hitlist, in order
to have a high propagation speed and no collisions during the
scanning.
3) Signpost Scanning: In DDoS attacks with Signpost
Scanning, some pieces of information on the compromised
machines are used to find new targets. As an example, e-
mail worms could exploit information from address books of
infected machines, a Web-server based worm could spread by
infecting each vulnerable client that access to the server Web
page, and so on.
4) Permutation Scanning: With this strategy, there is first
a brief Hitlist Scanning from which a small initial population
of agents is added to the botnet. Subsequently, all the compro-
mised hosts share a common pseudo-random permutation of
the IP address space and each IP address is mapped to an index
in this permutation. A machine infected during the initial phase
begins scanning through the permutation by using the index
computed from its IP address as a starting point. Whenever it
finds a machine that has already been infected, it chooses a
new random starting point.
5) Local Subnet Scanning: The Local Subnet Scanning can
be added to each of the previously described strategies, to
include a scan for targets located on the same subnet of the
compromised host. This technique allows a single copy of the
scanning program to compromise many vulnerable machines
behind a firewall.
F. Propagation Mechanism
After the recruitment and the exploitation, the agent ma-
chine is infected with the attack code and, based on the
mechanism chosen in this phase, it is possible to classify
DDoS attacks into three different categories [1], [3]: Cen-
tral Source Propagation, Back-chaining Propagation and Au-
tonomous Propagation.
1) Central Source Propagation: With this propagation ap-
proach, the attack code is stored on a central server (or a set
of servers) and downloaded through a file transfer mechanism
(e.g. wget or tftp) as soon as a new agent is compromised.
2) Back-chaining Propagation: Back-chaining enables the
machine that exploited the system to also inoculate the attack
code The infected machine then becomes the source of the
next propagation step. This propagation mechanism is more
durable then the Central Source one because it does not have
a single point of failure.
3) Autonomous Propagation: With this approach there are
no extra files downloaded, but the attack instructions are
directly injected into the target host during the same exploit
phase, reducing the possibility that the attack is discov-
ered [18].
G. Impact on the Victim
Depending on the impact that DDoS attacks have on the
victim, it is possible to classify them into two different
categories [3], [5]: Disruptive and Degrading.
1) Disruptive: This type of attacks try to completely deny
the victim services to its legitimate users. Nowadays, the ma-
jority of attacks belong to this class. Based on the Possibility of
Dynamic Recovery during or after a disruptive DDoS attack, it
is possible to further divide them in Dynamically Recoverable,
when a victim can automatically restore its services as soon
as the attack stops, and Dynamically Non-Recoverable, when
the victim needs human intervention, such as a reboot or even
a reconfiguration [3].
2) Degrading: This type of attacks aim at consuming some
portion of the victim resources without causing a total service
disruption, in order to remain undetected for an extended
amount of time. Nevertheless, the damage inflicted to the
victim could be huge: as an example, an attack that affects 30%
of the victim resources could lead to a DoS for some customers
during high load periods and the average performance of the
service would be worse than expected.
H. Attack Rate
The DDoS attack requires each agent to send a stream of
packets to the victim. The Attack Rate generated by the botnet
makes possible to classify DDoS attacks into two different
categories [1], [3]–[6], [19]: Constant Rate, Variable Rate.
1) Constant Rate: The botnet produces attack packets at
a fixed rate, usually at the highest rate possible. The output
burst is so powerful that the target resources are filled up very
quickly, hence the effects of the attack are quite instant on the
victim.
2) Variable Rate: The attack rate of agent machines varies,
in order to avoid or delay the detection. According to the
Rate Change Mechanism, variable rate DDoS attacks can be
further divided [19] into Increasing rate, where the attack
rate is gradually and constantly increased through time, and
Fluctuating rate where the attack is sporadically relaxed, in
order to reduce detection chances [1], [3], [5].
I. Persistence of Agent Set
This classification is based on the set of agents active at
any time of a DDoS attack. Based on the persistence of the
botnet, it is possible to distinguish two different categories [3]:
Constant Agent Set and Variable Agent Set.
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1) Constant Agent Set: All agents into the botnet act in the
same way, taken into consideration resource constraints: they
all receive the same set of commands and they are all engaged
simultaneously during the attack.
2) Variable Agent Set: The available agents are divided into
several groups and the attacker engages only one group of
agents at a given time. An agent could belong to more than
one group and each group could be engaged again after a
period of inactivity. As a matter of fact, this entails that the
botnet is internally partitioned.
J. Source Address Validity
Source address spoofing plays a critical role in most of
DDoS attacks, because it hinders the prosecution of the
attacker. Based on the Source Address Validity, it is possible
to classify DDoS attacks into [3]: Spoofed Source Address and
Valid Source Address.
1) Spoofed Source Address: This is the most common type
of DDoS attack, where source addresses are spoofed without
any kind of constraint. Moreover, the spoofing technique, that
defines how the attacker chooses the spoofed source address,
makes possible to further divide this DDoS attacks [3] in:
• Random Spoofed Source Address, in which source ad-
dresses are completely random 32-bit numbers [20], [21];
• Subnet Spoofed Source Address, in which source ad-
dresses are chosen within the agent machine subnet;
• On Route Spoofed Source Address, in which the address
is picked from a machine which is on the route (or in a
subnet) between the agent machine and the victim.
Based on the Address Routability, spoofed source address
DDoS attacks can be further divided in Routable Source
Address attacks, which spoof routable source addresses by
taking over the IP address of another machine, and Non-
Routable Source Address that spoof non-routable source ad-
dresses, which could belong to a reserved set of addresses
(such as private IP addresses) or be part of an assigned but
unused address space of a network.
2) Valid Source Address: These type of attacks usually
require interactive exchanges between botnet and victim, hence
a valid source address is needed.
K. Attack Traffic Distribution
The locations used as source of attack packets can be
utilized to classify DDoS attacks into two Attack Traffic
Distribution categories [4], [12]: Isotropic and Non-isotropic.
1) Isotropic: In Isotropic DDoS attacks, the attacker tries
to distribute as much as possible uniformly the origin of its
malicious packets.
2) Non-isotropic: In Non-isotropic DDoS attacks, the traf-
fic origin is more aggregated in specific parts of the Internet
than in others. It means that the victim receives malicious
packets from one or more directions which are partially or
totally aggregated and not uniformly distributed in the whole
Internet.
L. Resources Involved
Based on the amount of Resources Involved in a DDoS
attack, it is possible to classify it into two categories [22]:
Symmetric and Asymmetric.
1) Symmetric: In this case, the resources involved are of
the same type and scale as those denied to the victim. For
instance, in a Network Flooding Attack the attacker uses the
same amount of network bandwidth that the victim is deprived
of.
2) Asymmetric: In this case, the resources required by the
attacker are different from the resources neglected to the
victim, in terms of type and scale (e.g., DNS Amplification
Attack).
M. Victim Type
DDoS attacks can be classified according to the Victim
Type into four classes [3]: Application, Host, Network and
Infrastructure.
1) Application: In attacks of this class, one or more features
of a specific application on the victim host are targeted, with
the aim of preventing legitimate clients to use the application
and possibly clogging up host resources.
2) Host: In this class of attacks, the victim machine is
completely knocked out by disabling or overloading its com-
munication mechanisms (e.g., network interface or network
link). A peculiarity of this type of attacks is that all attack
packets have the destination address of the target host.
3) Network: In this case, the incoming bandwidth of a tar-
get network is consumed with attack packets whose destination
address can be taken from its network address space.
4) Infrastructure: In attacks of this class, the target is any
distributed service that is extremely relevant for either the
global Internet or a sub-network operations. The peculiarity of
these attacks is the simultaneity by which multiple instances
of the target service are attacked.
IV. IOT MALWARES WITH DDOS CAPABILITIES
Nowadays, one of the most popular way to deliver such
DDoS attacks is to target IoT devices. The choice is easily
explained by the high availability of such devices which, as
if it was not enough, are poorly protected by manufacturers
and poorly maintained by owners. Therefore, in order to
understand what problems we are facing and possibly find
a general solution, a thorough analysis of the present situation
is absolutely mandatory. We want to stress out that this
specific topic is inherently an extremely unstable one, with a
considerable number of offspring malwares that borrow lines
of code from deeply divergent families of malwares. Moreover,
source codes have been disclosed only for a portion of the
existing malwares and the largest part of these information
comes from complex reverse engineering jobs which makes
the whole situation even worse, if possible. In this section we
focus only on the DDoS capable IoT malwares, which entails
that we neglect on purpose some other IoT malwares that have
different goals, such as cryptocurrencies mining.
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TABLE I
IOT MALWARE DDOS CAPABILITIES
Malware DDoS
Name Year Source Code Agents CPU Architecture Model Feasible Attacks
Linux.Hydra 2008 Open Source MIPS IRC-Based SYN Flood, UDP Flood
Psyb0t 2009 Reverse Eng. MIPS IRC-Based SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ICMP Flood
Chuck Norris 2010 Reverse Eng. MIPS IRC-Based SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ACK Flood
Tsunami, Kaiten 2010 Reverse Eng. MIPS IRC-Based SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ACK-PUSH Flood, HTTP
Layer 7 Flood, TCP XMAS
Aidra, LightAidra, Zendran 2012 Open Source MIPS, MIPSEL, ARM,
PPC, SuperH
IRC-Based SYN Flood, ACK Flood
Spike, Dofloo, MrBlack,
Wrkatk, Sotdas, AES.DdoS
2014 Reverse Eng. MIPS, ARM Agent-Handler SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ICMP Flood, DNS Query
Flood, HTTP Layer 7 Flood
BASHLITE, Lizkebab, Torlus,
Gafgyt
2014 Open Source MIPS, MIPSEL, ARM,
PPC, SuperH, SPARC
Agent-Handler SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ACK Flood
Elknot, BillGates Botnet 2015 Reverse Eng. MIPS, ARM Agent-Handler SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ICMP Flood, DNS Query
Flood, DNS Amplification, HTTP Layer 7 Flood,
Other TCP Floods
XOR.DdoS 2015 Reverse Eng. MIPS, ARM, PPC,
SuperH
Agent-Handler SYN Flood, ACK Flood, DNS Query Flood, DNS
Amplification, Other TCP Floods
LUABOT 2016 Reverse Eng. ARM Agent-Handler HTTP Layer 7 Flood
Remaiten, KTN-RM 2016 Reverse Eng. ARM, MIPS, PPC,
SuperH
IRC-Based SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ACK Flood, HTTP Layer
7 Flood
NewAidra, Linux.IRCTelnet 2016 Reverse Eng. MIPS, ARM, PPC IRC-Based SYN Flood, ACK Flood, ACK-PUSH Flood, TCP
XMAS, Other TCP Floods
Mirai 2016 Open Source MIPS, MIPSEL, ARM,
PPC, SuperH, SPARC
Agent-Handler SYN Flood, UDP Flood, ACK Flood, VSE Query
Flood, DNS Water Torture, GRE IP Flood, GRE
ETH Flood, HTTP Layer 7 Flood
A. Linux.Hydra
Progenitor of all the IoT malwares, Linux.Hydra appeared
in 2008 as an open source project that specifically aimed to
routing devices based on MIPS architecture. The exploitation
phase relies on a dictionary attack or, in case that the target
device is a D-Link router, on a specific and well-known
authentication vulnerability [23]. Once that the device has
been infected, it becomes part of an IRC-Based network able
to perform only a basic SYN Flood attack. The malware
documentation reports that this malware also enables the
attacker to strike a UDP Flood attack, but online available
sources do not exhibit such capability [24]. All in all, even if
it is quite simple, this malware laid the groundwork for all the
successive MIPS-aiming malwares.
B. Psyb0t
Pretty much similar to Linux.Hydra, this malware appeared
on the wild in the early 2009. Compared to its predecessor,
Psyb0t is able to perform also UDP and ICMP Flood at-
tacks [23]. It targets the same MIPS architecture (therefore,
essentially network appliances) and, even though a direct
comparison cannot be performed since the sources have not
been disclosed, the two malwares show so many common
points that it is safe to assume that Psyb0t is a Linux.Hydra
offspring.
C. Chuck Norris
As soon as the Psyb0t botnet was taken down by its creator,
probably due to a growing interest towards his operations,
another competitor came out in 2010. Called Chuck Norris,
from a string found into the reverse engineered headers, this
malware has a lot of common points with Psyb0t, at a point
that it is probably its direct evolution [23]: the available attacks
are the same, apart from the lacking of ICMP Flood which is
replaced by the capability of carrying out an ACK Flood.
D. Tsunami/Kaiten
Last and strongest offspring of Linux.Hydra, Tsunami is
a fusion of Kaiten-Tsunami DDoS tool and Chuck Norris.
In particular, this malware shares with the latter many traits,
such as the same encription key and some CNC IP addresses.
Tsunami enables the botnet zombies to carry not only tradi-
tional SYN Flood, UDP Flood and ACK-PUSH Flood attacks,
but also some more sophisticated ones like HTTP Layer 7
Flood and TCP XMAS attacks. Interestingly, in 2016 this
malware was sneaked on purpose into the Linux Mint Official
ISO [25], jeopardising a huge quantity of freshly installed
OSes.
E. Aidra/LightAidra/Zendran
Born around 2012, these three malwares exhibit slight vari-
ations of the same source code, small enough to let us group
them under the same family. Compared to the aforementioned
families, the complexity of these malwares is higher: they
are able to compile on a number of different architectures
such as MIPS, ARM and PPC, even though the infection
method relies upon a simple authentication guessing [26]. The
resulting botnet architecture is, once again, IRC-based and the
type of deliverable attacks is still restricted to basic attacks
like SYN Flood and ACK Flood.
F. Spike/Dofloo/MrBlack/Wrkatk/Sotdas/AES.DdoS
After the Linux.Hydra family subsided, a new bunch of
malwares appeared in different times around 2014 [27]. Many
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different malwares (such as Spike, Dofloo, etc.) belong to this
family but they are so similar that it is hard to tell one from
another. What is clear is that, conversely from all the previous
families, the resulting botnet architecture is an Agent-Handler
based one. Moreover, a mechanism of persistence has been
developed by tampering with the /etc/rc.local file, aiming to
survive a device reboot. Another interesting characteristic is
the so-called SendInfo thread that tries to derive the computing
power of the infected host device [28], thus enabling the CNC
server to tune the intensity of DDoS jobs that each bot should
perform.
G. BASHLITE/Lizkebab/Torlus/Gafgyt
Another popular malware on the wild in 2014, BASHLITE
shares similar characteristics with the Spike malware family.
Particularly, the communication protocol is a lightweight ver-
sion of IRC, but it has been so heavily modified that the
resulting botnet architecture is totally non-dependant on IRC
servers, therefore this botnet can be considered an Agent-
Handler and not an IRC-Based one [29]. The variety of
architectures vulnerable to this malware is impressive, as even
SPARC devices can be infected. The DDoS attacks are basilar,
nothing more than traditional SYN, UDP and ACK Flood
attacks.
H. Elknot/BillGates Botnet
This 2015 malware has been mostly used by the chinese
DDoS’ers, to such a point that the whole family has been
dubbed China ELF [30]. Developed to target for the most
part SOHO devices, the vulnerable architectures are MIPS
and ARM; the possible DDoS attacks are quite a number,
included HTTP Layer 7 Flood and some other TCP Flood
attacks. Considering that all the available information are
derived from reverse engineering techniques and, in addition,
copious mutations of this malware has been created, in this
case it is particularly hard to sketch out detailed characteristics.
I. XOR.DDoS
In 2015, during the tide wave of malwares that exploited the
Shellshock vulnerability, XOR.DDoS started to silently infect
many IoT devices all around the world , even though it did
not rely upon the aforementioned vulnerability [31]. Probably
another product of the chinese DDoS community, this malware
is capable of various attacks like SYN Flood, UDP Flood,
DNS Flood and more complex TCP Flood ones. As reported
by Akamai [32], in October 2015 this botnet alone has been
able to hit one of their customers with a DNS Flood of 30
million queries per second, combined with a SYN Flood attack
of 140 Gbps.
J. LUABOT
Spotted in 2016, LUABOT is the first ever malware written
in LUA programming language. In particular, the DDoS in-
struction script is detached from the main routines and this
modular characteristic, highly simplified by the choice of
LUA, in the first stages prevented researchers from understand-
ing its real purpose [33]. So far, the only payload file that has
been identified suggests an HTTP Layer 7 Flood attack, but
we don’t exclude that some other kind of payload scripts are
available for this malware to be run. Much more interestingly,
this malware includes a V7 embedded JavaScript engine to
bypass DDoS protections offered by some enterprises, such
as Cloudfare and Sucuri [34].
K. Remaiten/KTN-RM
Appeared in 2016 alongside the much more famous Mirai,
Remaiten merges the main characteristics of two different
malwares, namely Tsunami and BASHLITE. In particular, the
DDoS attacks are mostly derived from the former malware,
whereas the telnet scanning capabilities are borrowed by the
latter one [35]; unlike BASHLITE, Remaiten botnet archi-
tecture is IRC-Based. Most of the embedded architectures
are vulnerable to Remaiten, which is unsurprising, since
that nowadays it is a common characteristic for all the IoT
malwares to be able to compile on different architectures.
L. NewAidra/Linux.IRCTelnet
NewAidra, also known as Linux.IRCTelnet, is somehow a
nasty combination between Aidra root code, Kaiten IRC-based
protocol, BASHLITE scanning/injection and Mirai dictionary
attack [36]. All the embedded devices based on standard
architectures can be infected by this malware and the variety
of attacks is large: starting from the standard attacks, the
attacker can also choose TCP XMAS and TCP Flood attacks
(as an example, URG Flood attack). At the present moment,
NewAidra is the strongest Mirai competitor in its worldwide
IoT infection crusade.
M. Mirai
Mirai is one of the most predominant malware of the last
years. It has been used to perpetrate some of the largest
DDoS attacks ever known, included the abuse of the French
internet service and hosting provider OVH on 22nd September
2016 [37], [38], the attack to KrebsOnSecurity blog on 30th
September 2016 [37], [39], and the takedown of Dyn DNS
services on 21st October 2016 [37], [40], [41].
The Mirai worm is designed to infect and control IoT
devices (such as home routers, DVRs, CCTV cameras, etc.,
mainly manufactured by XiongMai Technology) using a dic-
tionary attack based on 62 entries. Once exploited, the devices
are reported to a control server in order to be used as part of
a large-scale botnet [42]. Afterwards, the botnet can be used
to perpetrate several types of DDoS attacks exploiting a wide
range of protocols (such as GRE, TCP, UDP, DNS and HTTP).
V. DISCUSSION
By further analysing Table I we can highlight some in-
teresting data. First of all, source codes have been disclosed
only for few malwares and most of them have been analyzed
through reverse engineering techniques, which entails that part
of the available data, such as the relationship between the
different families of malwares, is based on incomplete and
limited information.
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Fig. 3. IoT DDoS Capable Malwares - Correlations
Talking about relationships, Figure 3 shows how the differ-
ent families are supposedly related to each other. Linux.Hydra
was the first IoT DDoS capable malware and its source
code evolved through the years into 3 different malwares. It
seemed that Tsunami would have been Linux.Hydra very last
evolution, but part of its code has also been used to develop
chunks of Remaiten and even NewAidra, which is one of
the most recently appeared malwares. Also, Figure 3 shows
that the older malwares were mostly unrelated to each other,
whereas in the last years we are witnessing a melting pot of
characteristics borrowed from different families, which results
into an increased complexity of detection and classification.
Nowadays we can clearly sense the growing in popularity
of IoT malwares that exhibit DDoS capabilities. Figure 4
shows the yearly progression of such malwares, as reported
in Table I, and clearly confirms this perception. As a matter
of fact, it highlights that 4 new families were born in 2016
alone, which is troubling since the previous record was of only
2 new malwares per year (namely in 2010, 2014 and 2015)
and before 2008 this category of malwares did not even exist.
Another thing that clearly stands out, is that the oldest
malwares were designed to target specific devices that used
MIPS processors, whereas the newest ones are able to target
a much broader variety of devices and architectures, such as
ARM and PPC.
Moreover, looking at the offensive capabilities we can
easily see how the most recent malwares are able to hit the
targets with much more attacks than the past. As an example,
Linux.Hydra was only able to carry out SYN Flood attacks,
but Mirai has been armed with refined attacks like GRE IP
Flood, GRE ETH Flood and even the so-called DNS Water
Torture. Furthermore, almost all the performable DDoS attacks
are ascribable into the Flood attacks category, explainable with
the enormous quantity of vulnerable IoT devices, which can
be easily enslaved with such malwares. As a matter of fact,
the Flood attacks require basic programming skills, few lines
of code (which is relevant with embedded devices) and very
little coordination between the bots.
Last thing, malicious coders take different approaches when
it comes to choose the resulting malware botnet architecture.
Some malwares build an IRC-based architecture and some
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Fig. 4. IoT DDoS Capable Malwares – Year progression, as shown in Table I
others build an Agent-Handler one, therefore we currently
cannot highlight a global favourite approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
The IoT earthquake shook the market and flooded it with a
huge amount of poorly secured devices, that were turned by
malicious attackers in a potential army, ready to be engaged
in highly disruptive activities, mainly DDoS attacks.
Motivated by the increasing number of DDoS attacks that
negatively characterize the IoT revolution and by the lack of
adequate literature on these attacks in the IoT context, in this
paper we have provided an analysis of IoT malwares exposing
DDoS capabilities. As a matter of fact, to the best of our
knowledge previous surveys about DDoS attacks are dated
before the IoT revolution. The analysis is based on an up-
to-date comprehensive taxonomy of DDoS attacks based on
previous scientific literature and the latest performed attacks
to IoT devices. We compared and analyzed the families of
malware that characterized the recent years of the IoT-DDoS
landscape. The aim of the analysis is to provide a first
reference to the scientific community in order to understand
all the latest types of DDoS attacks targeting the IoT domain.
We believe this study represents a key step in order to raise the
awareness of the research community and tackle this security
emergency.
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